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Introduction
Bubbles are based upon anticipated but non-sustainable capital gains that are not closely related to the net productivity of capital. As a consequence, the rising debt payments/net income makes the system more vulnerable to shocks either from the capital gains, productivity of capital or the interest rate. A crisis then occurs with bankruptcies and defaults. This paper addresses the question: How should creditors, banks and bank regulators evaluate and monitor risk of an excessive debt that significantly increases the probability of default?
This paper may be called: A Tale of Two Crises. The agricultural debt crisis of the 1980s is emblematic of the bubble-crisis phenomenon. I use this as a specific example of the usefulness of the stochastic optimal control analysis, because data are readily available 1 that correspond to the theoretical variables. One can just copy/paste the agriculture story in understanding the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007.
Agriculture flourished in the 1970s. Farm exports grew rapidly and along with the domestic inflation farm incomes reached all-time highs. These factors produced capital gains on farm assets. Equity rose significantly. Credit was readily available. Real interest rates were low and farmers used the rising value of farm assets as collateral for loans. Farmers would purchase farm real estate with moderate down payments and, after the value of the newly purchased land increased, would use the increased equity to buy additional farmland with minimal down payments. Higher levels of real estate debt were supplemented by debt to finance machinery and equipment. The speculation in land produced capital gains and raised the market value of equity (EQUITY). The ratio of interest service on the debt/value added (INTVA), the debt burden, rose significantly. See Figure 1 .
In the fall of 1979, the Federal Reserve undertook a restrictive monetary policy in order to reduce inflation and interest rates rose drastically. The resulting appreciation of the US dollar reduced foreign demand for US agricultural products. The decline in foreign demand was exacerbated by the debt crisis in the less developed countries. Farm exports declined by 40% from 1981 to 1986, at a time when productive capacity had increased. The result was an accumulation of huge surpluses of farm commodities in the early 1980s. When the bubble collapsed in 1980, asset values and equity fell drastically. The resulting rise in the debt burden was devastating, and the delinquency rate on loans (DELINQRATEFCS) rose drastically. One can just copy/paste the agriculture story in understanding the sub-prime mortgage crisis.
Banks should evaluate whether the borrower is likely to default. I apply several techniques in the extensive mathematical literature of stochastic optimal control (SOC) to derive an optimal debt in an environment where there are risks on both the asset and liabilities sides.
The ratio debt/net worth per se is not a significant explanation of defaults. The vulnerability of the firm to shocks, from either the return to capital, the interest rate or capital gain, increases in proportion to the excess debt, which is defined as the difference between the Actual and Optimal debt ratio. As the debt ratio exceeds the optimum, risk rises relative to expected return and default becomes ever more likely.
There are several parts to the analysis: A criterion function, A structural model, 
The Criterion Function
The lender evaluates what debt would maximize the expected (E) growth rate of the borrower's net worth over the period of the loan, an horizon of length T from the present t=0.
The borrower has a net worth X(t) equal to the value of capital K(t) less debt L(t). Initially net worth X = X(0) > 0. Eq. (1) is the criterion function. The bank wants to avoid borrower's bankruptcy (X = 0) by placing an infinite penalty on a debt that would lead to a zero net worth, bankruptcy. Equation (1a) is an alternative form of Eq. (1). The lender is very risk averse, since X(T) = 0 implies that W is minus infinity.. The next steps are to: explain the stochastic differential equation for net worth, relate it to the debt ratio, and specify what are the sources and characteristics of the risk and uncertainty.
Dynamics of Net Worth
In view of equation (1), the bank/lender should focus upon the change in net worth dX(t) of the borrower. It is the equal to the change in capital dK(t) less the change in debt dL(t).
Capital K = PQ, the product a physical quantity Q times the relative price P of the capital asset to the price of output, such as the GDP deflator. The change in capital has two components. The first is the change due to the change in relative price of capital, which is the capital gain or loss, K(dP/P) term. The second is investment, which is I = P dQ, the change in the quantity times the relative price. The change in debt dL is the sum of expenditures less income. Expenditures are the debt service r(t)L(t) at real interest rate r(t), plus investment I = P dQ plus either consumption, dividends or distributed profits C(t). Income Y(t) = β(t)K(t) is the product of capital times β(t) its productivity. Combining these effects, the change in net worth is equation
(2) and (2a).
(
Stochastic variables in bold are the real capital gain or loss (dP/P), the productivity of capital β(t) and r(t) the real interest rate. Term b(t) in (2a) subsumes the two sources of risk on capital: the capital gain or loss and the productivity of capital. The agricultural debt crisis and the sub-prime mortgage crisis can be understood in terms of equations (1) -(2). In one case, capital is land and equipment, and in the other it is residential housing.
The Stochastic Processes
Figure 3 graphs the time series of two stochastic variables in the agricultural sector: the productivity of capital β(t) = Y(t)/K(t) and the interest rate r(t). The productivity of capital is measured as GVACAP = β(t) = gross value added/value of farm assets. The second is INTDEBT = r = total interest payments/debt. The capital gain term dP/P (not graphed here) is not significantly different from zero, but has a very high variance. It is stationary, so that it is mean reverting to zero. For the housing market, the productivity of capital β(t) is the imputed rental value of the housing and dP/P is the capital gain CAPGAIN in figure 2.
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The uncertainty may have different forms. Since there is some ambiguity about describing the specific form of the stochastic processes in Figure 3 , I consider several cases. Case A assumes that the return on capital b(t) = (dP/P) + β(t) follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, Erogodic
Mean Reversion (EMR), equation (3a). The solution of this equation implies that the return b(t)
converges to a distribution with a mean of b, and a variance is σ 2 b /2α, where α is the speed of response. The interest rate r(t) is equation (4a), a Brownian Motion with Drift (BMD) process.
The mean is r and the variance is σ 2 r dt. Case B assumes that both the return to capital (Eq. 3b), and the interest rate (Eq. 4a) are described by Brownian Motion with Drift 4 . Case C, equations (3b) and (4b), is the reverse of case A. The return is BMD but the interest rate is EMR.
The mean (b, r) is written without any time index. Case A is eq. (3a), (4a); Case B is eq. (3b), (4a), Case C is eq. (3b), (4b).
Solution and interpretation of the optimal debt/net worth
The solution for the optimal debt ratio concerns the maximization of the expected growth rate of net worth, eq. (1) subject to eq. (2) and the appropriate stochastic process in BOX 1.
There are other reasonable criteria functions and stochastic processes. The mathematical techniques for their solution are discussed in the Fleming and Stein references above. Here, I simply state the results and provide a graphic interpretation that relates to the economics literature. Then I use the results in discussing the two crises.
The optimal debt/net worth ratio f*(t) = L(t)/X(t) in BOX 2 varies according to the three cases (A), (B) and (C) respectively. The asterisk denotes the optimal value. In each case, the numerator is a return less an interest rate, and the denominator is a variance. 4 Brownian Motion results from continuous independent increments with a zero expectation. See Øksendal.
In 
The optimal debt ratio f* maximizes the distance between Mean and Risk. It is the value in equations (5A), (5B) or (5C), depending upon the stochastic process. At this ratio, the expected growth rate is maximized for any given ratio C/X of consumption-dividends/net worth.
As the debt ratio f = L/X rises above the optimum f*(t), the Risk rises relative to the Mean, and the expected growth rate of net worth declines. At a debt ratio equal to max-debt, the expected growth rate is zero. When the debt ratio rises above max-debt, the expected growth rate is negative and risk is very high. The liklihood of bankruptcy increases continuously as the debt ratio rises above the optimum. The difference Ψ(t) = [f(t) -f*(t)] is the "excess debt" ratio. From figure 4, one sees that the likelihood of a serious decline in net worth that threatens bankruptcy is a continuous function of Ψ(t) the excess debt ratio. the excess debt, appropriate to the stochastic process 6 .
A Tale of Two Debt Crises: Agriculture and Subprime Mortgage
Both the agriculture and subprime mortgage crisis can be understood in terms of the SOC/DP analysis and Early Warning Signals are thereby derived. A bubble is a situation described by equation (7). The capital gain exceeds the interest on the debt, which in turn exceeds the productivity of capital. The only way that the borrower can pay the interest is by cashing in on the capital-gain.
(7) dP/P > r > β. BUBBLE P = price asset/GDP deflator (7a) dP/P < r. BURST
The basic proposition is that the relative price of an asset to the GDP deflator cannot continue to rise. When P stabilizes at a value related to the productivity of capital the capital gain dP/P disappears. A sufficient condition for the bubble to burst is that the relative price P stabilizes, dP/P = 0. The capital gain dP/P is less than r(t) the interest on he debt. When the bubble bursts, Eq. (7a), the borrowers are not able to refinance, cash in the capital gain, at the low old interest 5 See Crouhy et al Chapter 7 for a discussion of the usefulness of the VaR for risk management. 6 As the debt ratio exceeds max-debt, the expected growth rate becomes more negative and the variance rises. That is, the probability distribution of the growth rate shifts to the left. rate. Then b(t) -r(t) becomes negative. The cash flow plus the (zero or negative) capital gain is insufficient to service the debt.
The "market" used improper estimates of the variables that determine the optimal ratio in BOX 2. For the net return b(t) -r(t), the borrowers/lenders used [β(t) + dP(t)/P(t)] -r(t)], where dP/P is the capital gain based upon the recent past values, which were not linked to the productivity of capital. The error was to assume that the mean capital gain dP/P in Eq. (5B) could be based upon the values in the recent past 7 . Since their estimate of b(t) was high, say b 1 , and they assumed that the risk σ 2 = σ 1 2 was low they incurred a high debt ratio f 1 = (b 1 -r)/σ  2 .
When the capital gain disappeared -the bubble burst -the optimal debt ratio was considerably below the ratio f 1 = (b 1 -r)/σ  2 they incurred. For example, the new optimal ratio was f* in figure   4 , whereas they were holding what is now a value f 1 above max-debt. In figure 1 , the fall in agricultural equity -the collapse of the bubble -is seen in EQUITY. In figure 2 , the bursting of the mortgage market bubble is seen in the decline in the capital gain CAPGAIN, which became capital losses.
If they optimized on the basis of Eq. (5A), the assumption was that they could quickly and at negligible cost reduce their debt to a new level, based upon a lower b(t) -r(t). The error was to ignore the fact that when the equity bubble burst, they would have great difficulty in selling their assets at the pre-existing prices, because many other borrowers are also trying to sell the asset to pay off the debt. This liquidation generates bankruptcies and defaults.
What are Early Warning Signals of a debt crisis? How should the borrowers and lenders
have optimized? Consider each case in turn: agriculture, subprime mortgage market.
Agriculture
The appropriate measure of the return in Equations (5A) -(5C) depends upon the stochastic process. The capital gain term dP/P has a mean that is not significantly different from zero. One cannot be sure what is the appropriate stochastic process and hence optimal debt ratio. Therefore I take several approaches. In Case B, the optimal debt ratio is Eq. (5b). Using the mean values for (β -r) and its variance σ 2 , the optimal debt ratio is The debt ratio in the optimization is f = L/X = debt/net worth. However, there is a bias in using this as an empirical measure of an Early Warning Signal (EWS). The reason is that as net worth EQUITY collapses, this ratio jumps up violently. For this reason, in empirical work I prefer to use the ratio h = L/Y of debt (L) to (Y) to net income. Call h the debt ratio. In figure 5 , the normalized value of the debt ratio is:
The optimal debt ratio should either follow RETVAINTD, (Eq. (5A), (5C)) or be constant (Eq. (5B). My measure of an excess debt Ψ(t) is the difference between the normalized curves in figure 5 . Non-optimal debt would occur if the debt ratio were rising relative to its long term mean when the net return was declining relative to its mean. The probability of delinquency when the vector X is at its mean value is Φ(βX m ). The added probability resulting from the change in component X i in 2006 comes from β i dX i where β i is the regression coefficient of element X i whose change was dX i . Their results can be related to the mathematical analysis above and to the results for agriculture in figure 5 . In agriculture or in any other commercial enterprise, the concept of the productivity of capital is explicit. In the home mortgage market, this concept is implicit. One could argue that by owning a home one saves rental payments. Then the productivity of housing capital to households is the implicit net rental income/value of the home plus a convenience yield in owning one's home. This concept would correspond to β = Y/K in eq. (2) above. I also assume that the convenience yield in owning a home has been relatively constant. I try to approximate β by using the normalized ratio of rental income/disposable personal income. In between 6 and 6.5% pa. The GDP deflator varied between 2 and 4% pa. It is reasonable to argue that the longer run real appreciation of housing prices was not significantly greater than "the mortgage rate of interest", which is an ambiguous term 9 . Cash flow is K(t) dP(t)/P(t) and interest payments are r(t)L(t). As long as the quantity net cash flow Y(t) = [(dP/P(t) -r(t)L(t)/K(t)] is positive, more debt is induced to either spend or 9 purchase a home. Suppose that it is the latter, L(t)/K(t) = 1. The bubble is described by eq. (7) where dP/P > r > β. The crisis will occur when (7a) dP/P < r, the appreciation of housing prices is less than r, the rate of interest. Then net cash flow Y(t) is negative.
Falling growth in housing prices was the most significant variable accounting for the rise in the delinquency and default rates in table 1. This is consistent with the observation (Federal Reserve San Francisco) that there was a negative correlation between the rate of house-price appreciation and level of sub-prime delinquencies among metropolitan statistical areas.
There is a great heterogeneity in interest rates charged to the subprime borrowers, so it is difficult to state exactly what corresponds to r(t) in the analysis above. I therefore use The productivity of capital RENTRATIO was not rising, but L/Y the debt ratio ( figure 2) was rising rapidly. The rising debt could only be serviced from capital gains. Assume that over the earlier period 1980 -1998 the debt ratio was not excessive. From year 2000, the debt service deviated significantly from the rent ratio, because the actual debt ratio f(t) was stimulated by (dP/P -r ), the appreciation of housing prices relative to the interest rate.
The excess debt Ψ(t) = f(t) -f*(t) in 2004 was two standard deviations, which is an EWS of a crisis. The only thing that held off the crisis was the capital gain in excess of the interest rate. Net cash flow Y(t) was positive. But housing prices P cannot continue to grow at a rate above the interest rate 10 . We can be sure that, sooner or later, (7a) will occur. As soon as the appreciation stopped, dP/P became less than interest rate r. There would be no capital gains that could be converted into cash to pay the interest. When the households lost equity, the choice was between servicing the debt r(t)L(t) or abandoning the property and renting rather than owning housing. When eq. (7) becomes (7a), a crisis occurs with the consequent delinquencies, bankruptcies and defaults. As D-VH found, the most significant variable in explaining why year 2006 was so bad was that housing price appreciation disappeared. In terms of our analysis, debt became excessive, in terms of figure 4. . This can only be positive if the real appreciation of the housing [dP(t)/P(t)π(t)] exceeds the real rate of interest i(t). This is not a sustainable situation where the relative price of housing to the general price level is steadily rising.
Summary and Conclusions
How should lenders and investors optimally manage risk to avoid losses from the defaults and bankruptcies of the borrowers? The Agricultural debt crisis of the 1980s and the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007 followed similar scenarios. In each case, the growth of the debt was stimulated by capital gains on assets. Capital gains are not sustainable unless they reflect the growth of the productivity of capital. When the capital gains fall below the interest owed, a crisis will occur.
The object of this study is to evaluate if the debt is likely to lead to default and thereby derive theoretically based Early Warning Signals EWS of the vulnerability of the debtor to shocks. Given that the future is unpredictable, the optimal debt ratio is derived using the mathematical techniques of stochastic optimal control/dynamic programming (SOC/DP).
There are many sensible criteria of optimization. Since we are looking at the problem from the point of view of the lender/bank, we focus upon the debt/net worth ratio that would maximize the expected growth of the borrower's net worth over a given horizon. This is a risk averse strategy because it corresponds to maximizing the expected logarithm of net worth over a fixed horizon.
The evolution of net worth depends upon three stochastic variables and the selected debt ratio. The stochastic variables are: the productivity of capital, the interest rate and the relative price of assets/price of output. The optimum debt ratio depends upon the stochastic processes. In one case, the sum of the productivity of capital and the capital gain is assumed to be ergodic mean reverting (EMR), and the interest rate is Brownian Motion with drift (BMD). In the second case, the capital gain is assumed to have a zero mean, and both the productivity of capital and the interest rate are BMD. In each case, the optimal ratio debt/net worth is positively related to a measure of the productivity of capital less an interest rate and negatively related to a measure of variance, appropriate to the specific stochastic processes. In neither case should one assume that the capital gain, the growth of a relative price, will continue to exceed the interest rate.
The optimal debt/net worth ratio is derived in these two cases. The vulnerability to shocks from the stochastic variables is not directly related to the actual debt ratio. It is, however, directly related to the excess debt, equal to the actual less the optimal debt ratio. As the excess debt rises, the probability of a decline of net worth and the expected loss increase. Thereby our EWS is the magnitude of the excess debt.
The SOC/DP analysis is applied to the two crises. In agriculture, the unit is a commercial firm concerned with profits and there is a clear concept of the productivity of capital. In the home mortgage market, the unit is a household where the implicit rental income/net worth is the closest approximation to the productivity of capital. The story of the subprime mortgage crisis of 2006-2007 is a copy/paste of the agricultural debt crisis of the 1980s. In each case I derives EWS based upon measurable variables of an impending crisis.
